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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of sunlight for heat and power is a subject of much attention
now,' although architects of the past often designed buildings to make
best use of sunlight.2 The Japanese house traditionally has been de-
signed in conformance with precise calculations regarding the seasonal
variations in the angle of the sun's rays.' The homes of the cliff-dwell-
ing Indians of the American Southwest were protected from the over-
head rays of the sun at midday, yet received direct sunlight as the sun
dropped toward the horizon and the day cooled. 4 Modem architects
are once again giving considerable attention in their designs to solar
radiation.5 Energy can be saved through attention both to desired solar
access and to shade.6
The relative importance of sunlight and shade, and the best means
to use them for light, heat, and cooking will obviously vary according
to the latitude, local climate, terrain, and the presence of trees and
shrubs. Because wind will strongly affect energy use, windbreaks may
interact with these factors in determining the best orientation and de-
sign of a building to make maximum use of sunlight.7 If special col-
lecting devices are to be used to gather sunlight for heat and power,
the factors affecting access to solar energy will be at least as complex
as those faced by architects of the past, and the law governing access
to sunlight will face correspondingly difficult questions.
This Article will consider the problem of protecting access to sun-
light, only one of the legal problems posed by the prospect of expanded
1. Evidence of this abounds. A high percentage of all issues of such technically
minded mass circulation magazines as Popular Science and Popular Mechanics during
1975 and 1976 contained at least one article on solar utilization, and the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development has an office devoted to solar utiliza-
tion.
2. See, e.g., T. YosmDA, THE JAPANESE HousE AND GARDEN 15 (1955).
3. Id. Japanese courts recognize a "right to light" not only for interiors (via
windows), but also for the entire lot (house and garden). A recent decision brought a
settlement of nearly $7,000 to a sandalmaker and three of his neighbors whose homes
were placed into shade. In 1972 some 83 "sunshine suits" were brought in Japanese
courts. See Japanese Courts Back the "Right to Sunshine," N.Y. Times, July 18, 1976,
at 10, col. 1.
4. See Reitze & Prezyna, Utilizing Solar Power-The Institutional Challenges,
ENVT'L CoMMENT, April 1976, at 1.
5. See generally 2 J. FITCH, AMmucAN Bm.DINo: THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES
THAT SHAPE IT (1972).
6. Id. at 57.
7. F. CiING, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION ILLUSTRATED 1-7 (1975).
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use of solar energy.8 Two areas of law may provide helpful analogies
for the development of law protecting access to sunlight: The first po-
tential analogy is to natural resources law dealing with naturally mobile
resources such as water, oil, and natural gas. The second analogy is
to the law of access to and limitations on use of real property-both
in the sense of conventional human access (as by a path), and in regard
to access to daylight for windows. The latter might at first appear to
offer an exact counterpart to the problem of protecting access to solar
radiation for solar collection panels. As we shall see, however, the re-
lationship is not so close as it might initially seem. This Article will
then consider existing and proposed statutes designed to protect solar
access rights, and will conclude with a new proposal.
II. SOLAR RADIATION AS A NATURAL RESOURCE
Solar radiation is natural and has value; therefore it is by defini-
tion a resource. But what sort of resource is it? It provides visibility,
warmth, and the energy for photosynthesis at the foundation of the food
chain and is the origin of fossil fuels as well as the cause of wind (which
is also a source of energy).9
The full spectrum of the sun's rays which reach the earth has po-
tential value, not merely the direct visible light. Sunlight dispersed by
the atmosphere (indirect light) is of some importance, while the infra-
red portion of the spectrum, which can penetrate a cloud cover, is of
substantial importance in the use of solar radiation for heating.10 Solar
radiation thus comes to the earth's surface even on cloudy days, and
reaches all portions of the globe, but, like rain, varies greatly in inten-
sity and frequency.
As a resource, solar radiation is more like the action of the rain-
the movement of the water-than it is like the water itself. For solar
radiation (despite ordinary terminology) cannot be "collected" (gath-
ered and preserved in the same physical form) in the sense that rain-
8. Some of these problems are: a) barriers to use of solar energy systems in
building codes; b) jurisdictional labor disputes involving construction or installation of
new solar systems; c) vandalism directed to solar collectors and the adequacy of current
preventive and correctional methods; d) regulatory problems in regard to interaction
between public utilities and privately generated electricity or other power from solar
sources. See also notes 87-96 infra and accompanying text.
9. See generally F. DANrELs, DIREcr UsE OF r SuN's ENERGY (1974); McCaull,
Windmills, 15 ENVIRONMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 6.
10. See F. DANmLS, supra note 9, at 38.
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water can be collected. The essence of sunlight, for practical purposes,
is in its journey; its energy is transformed (and effectively ceases to
exist when it is "stopped" or "absorbed." Some of it is "stopped" by
the atmosphere, which is thereby warmed. Sunlight arriving at the
earth's surface is either reflected or absorbed. Absorbed sunlight may
be converted to chemical or electrical energy through plant photosyn-
thesis,"- photovoltaic electrical conversion (e.g., solar cells),12 or pho-
tochemical conversion.' 3 Most commonly, and of greatest immediate
economic importance, sunlight warms the object on which it falls.
Any surface exposed to solar radiation is heated to some degree.
The heat thus caused normally is reradiated or conducted to the atmos-
phere and adjoining materials. The "solar collector," which is the es-
sential part of any solar heating system, converts sunlight to heat and
transports the heat energy to a storage device before it can be reradi-
ated and "lost." In simplest terms, a solar collector is heated by the
sun; and air, water or some other substance passes through it or next
to it to absorb the heat and carry it where it can be better used or where
it can be stored for later use.14
In practice solar collectors for heating usually employ tubes con-
taining air or water, placed in a position exposed to sunlight." Us-
ually, these are contained within a dull black housing covered with glass
or clear plastic so that the entering sunlight is largely absorbed or
trapped beneath the glass as heat, as in a greenhouse. Many refinements
are possible: glass with a one-way mirror facing inward (to reduce re-
flection and reradiation); reflectors of varying degrees of sophistication
to concentrate additional sunlight; collectors that may be aimed
at the sun's arc to permit ideal directional angles even for collection
11. The resulting plant product, of course, can be burned for heat.
12. Photovoltaic electrical conversion is the generation of an electrical current by
the exposure of certain materials to light. See F. DANIELS, supra note 9, at 209-14.
13. Unlike photovoltaic conversion (in which no chemical change takes place),
photochemical electrical conversion generates an electrical current through a chemical
reaction caused by light, as in photosynthesis. The chemical reaction then reverses in
darkness, and may take place again. This is still only a theoretical possibility, in con-
trast with photovoltaic conversion, a practical success in spacecraft but still not eco-
nomically feasible in earth-bound applications. See id. at 214.
14. For a review of the possible techniques of collecting solar energy, see, e.g.,
Tamplin, Solar Energy, 15 ENVIRONMENT, June 1973, at 16.
15. See, e.g., collectors manufactured by KTA Corp., Rockville, Md.; other advanced
collectors made by Calmac Mfg. Corp., Englewood, N.J. (flexible rubber, comparatively
cheap); Ametek, Hatfield, Pa. (collector using unusual selective coating). Descriptions
are available from the manufacturers or from Solar Industries Association, Suite 632,
1001 Conn. Ave., N.W., Wash. D.C. 20036.
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systems on flat roofs.' A pump usually circulates the air or water,
through the pipes where it is warmed, then down to a reservoir (some-
times just a bin of stones) where the hot material from the pipes re-
leases its heat, and is circulated back to the collector to be warmed
again. If air is used in the tubes, however, it may be released into
the building to heat it. Many systems use water heated in the collec-
tor in radiators for heating or directly for bathing or cooking. The
number of possible variations is immense, and many fine points affect
the efficiency of different designs.17  Further discussion would be
outside the scope of this Article, but a brief summary of the claims
made by manufacturers of various collectors' is relevant on a few
points. Collectors must be exposed to direct sunlight for all but the
lowest efficiency operation, but need not be tilted to face directly at
the sun; horizontal collectors on flat roofs are as efficient as angled
collectors, but may require more frequent cleaning. Exposure to direct
sunlight during only a portion of the day may be sufficient for efficient
operation: complete freedom from shadow is not required. In some
cases, reflectors mounted some distance from a collector may focus sun-
light on it, to increase the area from which sunlight is collected or to
avoid the problems of shadows on the roof of a building on which col-
lectors are installed. The latter may be a means to circumvent diffi-
culties caused by new construction that would otherwise cast existing
collectors into shade, and should be kept in mind as an alternative rem-
edy in protecting existing solar access rights.
The possibility of redirecting sunlight through the use of reflectors
shows that sunlight is a resource that can be transported for modest
distances. Further attempts to subcategorize sunlight as a natural re-
source are interesting, but of doubtful legal utility. Is solar radiation
a "renewable" or a "nonrenewable" resource? Actually, it defies cate-
gorization in this manner. It need not be "renewed" in the sense that
renewable resources such as trees or trout must be renewed. Yet nei-
ther is it a nonrenewable resource, since use will not diminish it. Sun-
light striking earth is exhausted in its transformation into heat, whether
or not such heat is used by humans; it is the same if it heats the air
within a house or the air outside it.
16. A variety of devices is offered by the 40 members of the Solar Industries Asso-
ciation. See note 15 supra.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. See note 15 supra.
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As a resource solar radiation bears some resemblances to air. Both
are "free," and can be contaminated in different ways. Air can mix
with harmful materials; the harmful portion of solar radiation (the ul-
traviolet part of the spectrum) can increase through destruction of the
ozone layer of the atmosphere.19 The usefulness of air to human be-
ings can decrease through changes in the proportions of its composition
(e.g., too little oxygen). The usefulness of solar radiation for heating
purposes can be greatly reduced by air pollution that blocks visible
light. Access to air is not normally a problem, however, and these
comparisons should indicate only that solar radiation for heat and power
is not precisely like any other resource; we should be cautious in at-
tempting to treat it as a resource for legal purposes.
A. The Water Resources Comparison
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 193120
Since they [rivers] are the natural resources of heaven and earth,
and are not produced by human power, they ought to be shared
in common with all people.
-Kung-yang, circa 2400 B.C.2
The law of water resources has been the subject of multivolume trea-
tises,22 yet for our purposes must be summarized in a few hundred
words. Thus the generalizations which follow should properly be sub-
ject to numerous qualifications and exceptions which go unmentioned.
The traditional legal treatment of surface water resources in the east-
ern United States (where water is less scarce than in the West) has
been a theory known as riparian rights.23 In briefest form, this meant
that owners of land that abutted rivers, streams and to a lesser extent
lakes (under a similar concept called littoral rights) could withdraw
whatever water they wished, for any purpose they wished, while those
who did not own such land were prohibited from withdrawing water. 24
19. Gates, Weather Modification in the Service of Mankind: Promise or Peril?, in
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 33 (H. Helfrich ed. 1970).
20. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
21. COMMENTARY ON THE SPRING AND AUTUMN BooK OF CoNFucIus.
22. See, e.g., WATERS & WATER Riom (R.E. Clark ed. 1970) (in seven volumes).
23. 7 id. §§ 610-13.
24. Id. §§ 614.1-.3.
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Inroads developed in this system from two directions: one was the de-
veloping competition due to increased population density for the avail-
able water; the other was the increasing role of the public use of water,
both for consumptive (e.g., household) and nonconsumptive (e.g.,
transportation) uses. 25 The result of these pressures was the develop-
ment of standards of "reasonable use" with regard to downstream ri-
parian owners,26 and an active role for local governments or special
water districts in condemning or purchasing consumptive water rights
for the general citizenry. State statutes assured access to nonriparians
for shipping. 7 Deficiencies in this riparian rights system appear when
the demand for water exceeds the supply. Use of water in amounts
and for purposes that will satisfy a test of "reasonableness" at one time
may not do so somewhat later, literally even overnight, if water levels
drop precipitously. Lawsuits are an unsatisfactory means of settling
disputes during a sudden shortage. Even if a determination in one dis-
pute can timely resolve a temporary problem case-by-case decisions
will not necessarily assure a water supply, nor even provide a
coherent legal approach, during an unforeseen drought. Prior stand-
ards of priorities of use in times of shortages may work reasonably well
when shortages are fairly rare, but if demand greatly exceeds supply,
the riparian rights systems may become unworkable. The expansion
of water-consumptive uses by electric power plants and other industrial
facilities has forced many eastern states to reconsider their traditional
modified riparian water rights systems, and some now apply selected as-
pects that have been used in the "appropriation doctrine" states.2"
The appropriation doctrine is the basic legal theory of water re-
source allocation in the western states. It rests on the principle that
25. See Geigler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in WATER REsoURcES
AmD THE LAw 49, 70-72 (1958).
26. See Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in con-
nection with his riparian estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed,
provided he leaves the current diminished by no more than is reasonable, hav-
ing regard for the like right to enjoy the common property by other riparian
owners.
Id. at 88-89, 103 N.E. at 89.
27. See J.K. ANGELL, A TREATSE ON TIM LAW OF WATERCOURSES 702-15 (J.
Perkins ed. 1877).
28. The first steps in this direction were the "mill statutes" giving mill owners
prescriptive rights and powers of eminent domain. See id. at 637-76. Current statutes
are collected in F. TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERImLS ON WATER LAw, REsoURcE UsE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcroN 455-56 (2d ed. 1974).
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whoever first begins to use ("appropriates") a source of water is en-
titled to continue such use at the same rate.20 This applies without
regard to riparian ownershipY0 All states now require certain proce-
dures to establish this right, 1 and some states issue permits for specific
rates of water use at particular times of the year.82 An administrative
body or water master may be required not only to determine the valid-
ity of claims of established use, but also to establish priorities8 3 (e.g.,
drinking water ahead of irrigation), although the general rule is still
first-come, first-served. 4 Thus, in both the riparian and appropri-
ations states, there is a trend to limit property rights from absolute
priority rights, at least in times of shortage. The principal benefit
of the appropriation doctrine system is that it is relatively more cer-
tain. Despite the imposition of drought priorities,, an established water
user in western states has little fear that later demands for the water
downstream will be given equal weight with his established use. 6
There is no requirement for those with prescriptive rights to water to
share the water supply with those who later may wish to use it. This
legal certainty obviously adds greatly to the value of land possessing
such water rights; in many cases such land might be almost worthless
without such legally assured rights. An additional advantage of the ap-
propriation doctrine system is that when priorities must be set, a water
master can do so with an overall view of the problem, rather than a
court trying to determine "reasonable use" in an isolated instance. 0
Details of the application of the appropriation doctrine and the permit
systems (where they exist), as would be expected, differ considerably
among the 17 western states.3
29. See F. MALONEY, R. AUSNESS, & J. MoRIs, A MODEL WATER CODE WITH
COMMENTARY 156 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MALONEY].
30. Riparian doctrine of the common law was based on the private ownership of
land bordering streams. The division of the public lands of the western states, largely by
appropriation, required a different body of law. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 140-41
(1855).
31. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 455A (1971).
32. See, e.g., id. § 455 A.28 (3).
33. See MALoNEY, supra note 29, at 157.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 455A (1971); Cf. MODEL WATER UsE Act §
407(d) (1958).
37. For a summary of the terms of the statutes, see MALONEY, supra note 29, at 156-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/1
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Even from this brief and overgeneralized account, it should
be apparent that water resources law offers several possible approaches
to allocating a flowing natural resource which, like sunlight, is fre-
quently blocked (or diverted) by property owners "upstream."
Among these concepts are:
a) [from the appropriation doctrine] the allocation of rights on a first-
to-use basis;
b) [from riparian rights theory] the right of all property owners with
access to the flow to make reasonable use, even if this means a reduction
in the possible use by a prior "downstream" user;
c) [from both modem appropriation and riparian theory] setting
priorities among various uses of the resource as a permissible limita-
tion on resource or real property use;
d) [from both systems] condemnation of the resource for public use;
e) [from appropriation states] resource boards or masters replace
the court system in solving problems of resource allocation, once a legis-
lative body has established the rules.
Water-use law also suggests that government regulation of a resource
already in use may disturb existing property rights. To the extent sun-
light and flowing water are similar, no constitutionally protected property
rights prevent state regulation. The United States Supreme Court up-
held state regulation of water use under the police power in Connecti-
cut v. Massachusetts,3" rejecting the argument that each riparian owner
had a vested right to water flow. The Court upheld the power of a
state to allocate flowing waters for such purposes as it may deem wise. 9
The existence of proprietary rights to water, and the extent to which
state law protects them, is a difficult question generally beyond the
scope of this Article. Proprietary rights may exist in groundwater un-
der some circumstances in some jurisdictions, but the general rule for
surface water is that the right is merely one of usufruct.40
The question of proprietary versus usufructuary interest is occasion-
ally significant. "For so long as proprietary rights can be asserted in
the principal sources of stream flow, the public usufructuary rights in
the watercourses themselves are very tenuous, existing only by the
38. 282U.S. 660 (1931).
39. 1d. at 670.
40. See 6A AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 28.61-.63 (A. Casner ed. 1954).
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grace of the upper basin landowners."" Considerable flexibility in
characterizing property rights in flowing water is therefore possible, and
superiority of proprietary to usufructuary rights can be used to justify
varied degrees of public control.42 Commentators have called for a
more frank recognition of the policy reasons for the priorities assigned
to different uses of water.4 1 The following passage indicates the limi-
tations of traditional common-law categories and suggests an approach
that may be equally useful in allocating access to sunlight:
By forcing individual claimants of water to press their claims on the
merits of the particular uses desired to be made, rather than by reliance
on tradition, custom, or precedent, a more rational law of water uses
might be fashioned. By highlighting the basic truism that all allowed
uses of water achieve their status only because they are thought at the
time to be in the social interest, such a distribution of power might create
an attitude more receptive to new adjustments of power that changed
circumstances dictate.44
B. Oil and Gas Law Analogies
Another body of law that offers potentially useful legal concepts for
adaptation to preserving access to sunlight is oil and gas law." Modem
American oil and gas law seeks to maximize long-term production from
deposits;4 6 the opportunity to extract oil or gas is distributed in propor-
tion to property ownership of mineral rights under areas of land sur-
face.4" Regulation is necessary because of the "fugacious" or migra-
tory characteristics of underground oil and gas, which move toward low-
pressure areas created by drilling. Extraction at one point from a pool
will lower reserves in all portions of the common pool beneath adjoin-
ing property. This fact originally forced land owners to drill as many
holes as possible to extract oil or gas before neighbors could get to it.
This not only benefited one land owner at the expense of others, but
was also wasteful because many wells in a small area led to a quicker
41. Id. § 28.61, at 186.
42. Id. at 186-87.
43. See, e.g., G. WArrE, A FOUR-STATE Co inavTnw ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC RIGHTS
IN WATER 1 (1960).
44. Id.
45. See generally H. WmILAms & C. MEYERs, Om & GAS LAw (abr. ed., 1975
rev.).
46. See, e.g., id. at 593-99 (small tracts may be allowed or required to combine
drilling to maximize production from a pool).
47. Id. at 13-17.
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drop in the pressure needed to extract the oil, and total production gen-
erally was much less than if a few wells had been used to effect the
extraction over a greater period of time.48
In the leading case of Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.,4 9 the Supreme
Court of Texas summarized the state's law in this area. Elliff was a
suit for damages against a landowner sharing a common oil and gas
pool. The defendant allegedly was negligent in permitting a well to
blow out, resulting in a fire that lasted for several years and deprived
the neighboring plaintiff of his rightful share of the pool. The
Texas court had this to say:
[Olur attention will be confined to the sole question as to whether
the law of capture absolves respondents of any liability for the negligent
waste or destruction of petitioners' gas and distillate ...
We do not regard as authoritative the three decisions by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana to the effect that an adjoining owner is without right
of action for gas wasted from the common pool by his neighbor, because
in that state only qualified ownership of oil and gas is recognized, no
absolute ownership of minerals in place exists, and the unqualified rule
is that under the law of capture the minerals belong exclusively to the
one that produces them ...
In Texas, and in other jurisdictions, a different rule exists as to owner-
ship. In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title
in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land. [citations
omitted]. The only qualification of the rule of ownership is that it must
be considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to
police regulations. [citation omitted]. The oil and gas beneath the soil
are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns separ-
ately, distinctly, and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and
is accorded the usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the
minerals or destroy their market value.
[There is still some disagreement about the character of oil and gas
ownership.] However, as was said by Professor A. W. Walker, Jr., of
the School of Law of the University of Texas: "There is no oil or gas
producting [sic] state today which follows the wild-animal analogy to
48. Id. at 10-11. Wasteful practices were protected by the "rule of capture":
If an adjoining owner drills his own land and taps a deposit of oil or gas,
extending under his neighbor's field, so that it comes into his well, it becomes
his property.
Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 670 (1895). See 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 148, 150-55.
49. 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
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its logical conclusion that the landowner has no property interest in the
oil and gas in place."
Thus it is seen that, notwithstanding the fact that oil and gas be-
neath the surface are subject both to capture and administrative regu-
lation, the fundamental rule of absolute ownership of the minerals in
place is not affected in our state. In recognition of such ownership, our
courts, in decisions involving well-spacing [to permit maximum long-
term output] of our Railroad Commission [which in Texas regulated
the oil and gas industry], have frequently announced the sound view
that each landowner should be afforded the opportunity to produce his
fair share of the recoverable oil and gas beneath his land, which is but
another way of recognizing the existence of correlative rights between
the various landowners over a common reservoir of oil or gas.50
The Texas courts viewed fugacious minerals as a variety of real estate,
rather than as a species of wild animal subject to capture; this al-
lowed the courts to use the real-property concept of waste to prevent
dissipation of the resource:
The fact that the owner of the land has a right to take and to use
gas and oil, even to the diminution or exhaustion of the supply under
his neighbor's land, does not give him the right to waste the gas. His
property in the gas underlying his land consists of the right to appropri-
ate the same, and permitting the gas to escape into the air is not an
appropriation thereof in the proper sense of the term.51
The analogy with sunlight is once again apparent, if imperfect. As
in the case of water use, it is possible to apply either a rule of capture
(appropriation) or to view sunlight as a resource appurtenant to the
real property on which it falls, a kind of "superficial" resource analo-
gous to underground minerals. The law of fugacious minerals shows
that courts must recognize some rights other than those deriving from
first capture in order to prevent waste. The owner of one parcel may
entirely appropriate or waste the sunlight above an area, like a pool
of oil or gas beneath it. Tall structures may block the light without
using any of it, an act analogous to the waste of natural gas. The com-
mon "pool" of sunlight can be most efficiently used only if it is appor-
tioned among the several owners of property with access to it.
50. Id. at 579-82, 210 S.W.2d at 560-62.
51. Id. at 583, 210 S.W.2d at 563 (emphasis added), citing Annot, 85 A.L.R. 1154,
1156 (1933).
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III. SOLAR RIGHTS IN TRADITIONAL REAL
PROPERTY LAW
Sunlight may be thought of as part of the property it strikes. There
is no clear-cut dividing line between this and the view of sunlight as
a resource. The oil and gas law analogy, for instance, draws on tra-
ditional aspects of property law such as waste; oil and gas law is a spe-
cialized form of real property law, and this section will therefore over-
lap the preceding to some extent.
A. Easements and Related Concepts
A large body of common law involves access across others' land for
various purposes, ' and a long series of cases involves preserving win-
dow access to daylight. 3 The early English cases did not recognize
any right to receive the direct rays of the sun, as distinct from rights
to ambient light." The cases dealing with access to sunlight concern
only window light, required for visibility indoors.!5 Light under these
circumstances would not likely be considered an economic use, despite
the possibilities under English law for the payment of compensation as
relief.5 6
Easements are limitations enforceable in law that diminish the rights
associated with one parcel of land (the servient tenement) for the
benefit of another parcel of land (the dominant tenement).57 Similar
restrictions may benefit a person rather than a parcel of land (an ease-
ment in gross).58 Courts of equity recognize a parallel system of
rights, called servitudes. 9 Various terms, such as rights-of-way, quasi-
easements or restrictions on land use may be used either to distinguish
separate rights from true easements and servitudes, or simply as alter-
nate terminology for easements and related concepts. The present dis-
cussion is limited to easements and is intended solely to investigate the
52. See, e.g., W. FINCH, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY ON LAND 788-
856 (2d ed. 1920).
53. See generally B. ANSTEX & M. CHAVASSE, THE RIGHT TO LIGHT (1963).
54. Id. at 3.
55. See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
56. See id.
57. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 40, § 8.4, at 231-32.
58. Id. at 235-36.
59. See, e.g., Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L
REv. 951 (1942).
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distinction between rights of access that are contractual and personal,
and those that "run with the land."
Many types of easements are possible, and several sorts are quite
commonplace.6° The most familiar permit utility lines or pipes to cross
or simply enter upon, over or under the surface of land not owned by
the utilities. While it is sometimes said that every easement requires
a dominant as well as a servient tenement,"' in the United States utility
rights-of-way are true easements in favor of a person; there is no dom-
inant tenement.62
A basic division among easements is between affirmative easements
and negative easements: The former involve access to the land limited
by the easement;63 the latter involve only a limitation on use of the
servient tenement.64 An affirmative easement might consist of a right
to lay a pipe across the servient tenement, or to drive across it. Such
easements can sometimes be created by open and unpermitted use for
a period of years-that is, by prescription or adverse use.65  The ease-
ment for light and air exemplifies the negative easement, a right to pro-
hibit on the servient tenement construction that would block the natural
passage of light and air to the dominant tenement. Negative ease-
ments of this kind cannot be created by prescription; since there is no
"adverse use" of the servient tenement simply by enjoyment of the use
of light on the dominant tenement, no right to the creation of such a
negative easement by prescription is recognized today in the United
States,66 although the English common law did recognize an easement
to light through implication or prescription. 67
60. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 40, §§ 8.1-.108, at 225-314.
61. See Hawkins v. Rutter [1892] 1 Q.B. 668.
[In strictness, and according to the proper use of legal language, the term
'easement' does imply a dominant tenement in respect of which the easement
is claimed, and a servient tenement upon which the right claimed is exercised.
Id. at 671.
62. See, e.g., Gelfine v. Thompson, 76 Ohio App. 64, 62 N.E.2d 590 (1945) (gas
pipeline easement is in gross; alienable).
63. See 2 AMmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 40, § 8.11, at 236.
64. Id. § 8.12, at 236-37.
65. Id. §§ 8.44-.46, at 264.
66. No American decision has been cited, and independent research has re-
vealed none, in which it has been held that-in the absence of some contrac-
tual or statutory obligation-a landowner has a legal right to the free flow of
light and air across the adjoining land of his neighbor.
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla.
1959). See also Parker & Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
67. An early case following the English common law doctrine of ancient lights,
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Easements to light and air created by contract or conveyance are uni-
versally recognized in the United States.68  They may be placed in
deeds when property is sold, established by city ordinance, or created
through contract between a landowner and others.69
1. The Doctrine of Ancient Lights
William Aldred's Case,7 0 decided in 1611, held that a right to day-
light had been acquired through long use. Under the "doctrine of an-
cient lights," the court could order compensation for excessive reduc-
tion in natural light to a window if the owner or his predecessors in
ownership had used that source of daylight in the building's interior
without interruption for a period of time "whereof the memory of man
runneth not to the contrary. ' 71  The period was potentially variable,
but presumably could extend to the outer limit set by statute which was
the beginning of the reign of Richard the Lion-Hearted in 1189.72 In
practice, a period of 30 to 40 years was generally used, shortened
to 20 years by the Limitation Act of 1623, 7- and lengthened to 27 years
by the Right of Light Act of 1959. 71
The test under the doctrine of ancient lights of excessive reduction
of daylight was applied at the scene by a jury. On a day with "full
daylight" (the rule was no more precise than this), the jury was asked
to decide whether an average person in the better-lit half of the room
would wish artificial light to carry on his work as usual. This legal
standard became known as the "grumble test," and was no more sci-
entific than its name, despite later efforts to make it more objective
through various methods of calculation or measurement. 75
Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873), was overruled in 1939 by Lynch v. Hill, 24
Del. Ch. 86. 6 A.2d 614 (1939). No American jurisdiction presently finds a vesting of
rights to daylight absent a specific agreement.
68. "It is universally assumed, without controversy, that easements of light, air, and
view may be created by express grant." Annot., 142 A.L.R. 467, 468 (1943).
69. Id.
70. 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
71. Id. at 58b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 820-21.
72. See B. ANSTEy & M. CHAvAssE, supra note 53, at 6.
73. 29 James I, c.16 (1623). This was incorporated into the successor act, The
Prescription Act of 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c.71, § 3, and was then replaced by The Rights
of Light Act of 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 11, c.56.
74. 7 & 8 Eliz. II, c.56 (1959).
75. See, e.g., Ough v. King [1967] 3 All E.R. 859, which affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the standards for the "grumble test" could vary with the times, and that
adequate illumination at one time might not be so considered today. Earlier modern
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2. Common-Law Rights to Light In the United States
The British doctrine of ancient lights has been rejected in the United
States.76 In the absence of an express agreement or conveyance,
therefore, the owner of property generally has no common-law right
of access to sunlight. The theory of spite-fence cases has occasion-
ally been argued to prohibit construction of a fence or wall that would
block sunlight from an adjoining structure,77 but the courts regularly
reject this approach.78 Nor have courts been willing to find an ease-
ment for light created by prescription or implication.79
Several states have reacted to the harshness of the common law in
this field by creating statutory remedies. Massachusetts, for instance,
has enacted a version of the spite-fence doctrine:
A fence or other structure in the nature of a fence which unnecessarily
exceeds six feet in height and is maliciously erected or maintained for
the purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of adjoining property
shall be deemed a private nuisance. Any such owner or occupant in-
jured in the comfort or enjoyment of his estate thereby may have an
action of tort for damages under chapter two hundred and forty-three.80
It may also be that, despite the rejection of the spite-fence doctrine
and easement theories by appellate courts, numerous suits are threat-
ened or brought in lower courts on some version of these theories.
The threat of such suits, and the statutes that have been enacted, pro-
vide a imall measure of protection to the property owner seeking to
cases noting variable factors are Horton's Estate Ltd. v. James Beattie Ltd. [1927] 1 Ch.
75; Fisbenden v. Higgs & Hill, Ltd. [1935] All E.R. 435. A brief but useful summary of
British law on the subject is Wilkinson, Law of Easements: Let There be More Light,
118 THn NEW L.J. 7 (1968). See also the detailed treatment of the technical problems
of measurement in the latter half of B. ANSTEY & M. CHAvAsss, supra note 53.
76. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. 1959).
77. See, e.g., Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); Parker &
Edgarton v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
78. See Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d 374 (1950); Cohen v. Perrino,
355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947). In Cohen, the court ruled that an owner may erect
upon his own land a building that obstructs the light, air and view of an adjoining owner,
even though the building serves no useful purpose and is erected solely to annoy the
owner of the adjoining property and to interfere with his use and enjoyment of the land.
This extreme position for an American jurisdiction accords with the English position
when the doctrine of ancient lights does not apply. See Rumble, Limitations on the Use
of Property by Its Owner, 5 VA. L. REv. 297, 306 (1918).
79. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
80. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 49, § 21 (1966).
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assure his access to sunlight. Even the most extensive common-law
easements, or the spite-fence doctrine, however, would protect only a
minimum measure of interior illumination.8' Enough light to work in-
doors during bright days is generally available in American housing;
in any case, such protections fall far short of what would be needed
to assure access to the economic values of outdoor direct sunlight, fall-
ing on a solar collector.
Some common-law theories remain to be tested. Plaintiffs have al-
leged trespass in suits to abate air pollution, with limited success.8 2
The intrusion of a shadow cast by structures on adjoining property
might also, conceivably, be treated as a trespass, or a private nuisance.
No cases have been reported on a trespass or a nuisance theory. Either
would raise serious objections by asserting a kind of absolute right to
access to sunlight.83
B. Building Codes and Zoning Regulations
The most significant regulation of access to sunlight comes from a
complex set of regulations and ordinances including building codes, set-
back requirements, and general zoning provisions for use and popula-
tion density. In upholding a zoning regulation that barred apartment
buildings from an area of single-family residences, the United States
Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,8 4 found the
zoning within the police powers of the state:
in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the [presumably single-family, detached homes]
residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one
apartment house is followed by others, interfering by their height
and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of
the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes .... 85
81. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
82. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 316 F.2d 272 (9th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing,
324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964); Arvidson v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957); Fairview
Farms Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959); Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918
(1960).
83. See notes 119-25 infra and accompanying text.
84. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
85. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
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The landmark Euclid case showed a perhaps antiquated and class-
prejudiced view of apartment houses, but recognized the role of sun-
light in building restrictions. Courts continue to recognize the dual na-
ture of height regulations as a restriction on density of use as well as
a device to protect access to light and air.8 These cases have con-
sidered sunlight a health benefit and an amenity, but the courts have
not ignored economic values in this respect, an overriding consideration
in the case of solar rights for energy.
Height regulation alone, of course, will not ensure a fixed amount
of access to natural light, even on flat ground. "The height of the pro-
posed buildings cannot be the sole consideration on this question but
rather the spacing between the buildings."' s , Variances or prepared
"light angle" setback requirements may thus provide for greater height
for buildings constructed at greater than the normal distance from the
property lines. Courts uphold zoning variances to accomplish this:
It would be difficult, we think, to maintain that the purpose of protecting
the light and air of the neighboring properties was defeated by a vari-
ance granted upon terms protecting such light and air better than it
would have been protected if a building had been constructed on the
same site in strict accord with the Regulations, without any variance at
all.88
Thus, purpose is reasonably placed ahead of mere mathematical regu-
lation, a point to remember in drafting acts intended to protect access
to sunlight.
Because zoning statutes and regulations derive their authority from
the police power of the state, they often contain language referring to
public health and safety.8 9 In upholding zoning regulations in Euclid,
the Supreme Court used language that created a vague impression of
health: "... the free circulation of air . . . rays of the sun . ...
86. See, e.g., Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Highland Park, 9 IIl. 2d 364,
137 N.E.2d 835 (1956); Sisters of Bon Secours Hospital v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8
Mich. App. 342, 154 N.W.2d 644 (1967).
87. Hendlin v. Fairmount Constr. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 310, 326, 72 A.2d 541, 549
(Ch. 1950).
88. Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Buschman, 227 Md. 243, 248, 176 A.2d
355, 358 (1961).
89. See, e.g., the Colorado Solar Easement Act, ch. 326, § 2, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws
1430: "The general assembly hereby finds ... this act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health and safety."
90. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
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Courts sometimes acknowledge, however, that the true justification for
regulating the height of buildings is economic:
[The proposed building] would obstruct the view substantially and de-
preciate the value of many properties in the area. Expensive homes
directly across the street to the south will be depreciated in value ap-
proximately 20 per cent.91
Although the majority of zoning cases may involve economic consid-
erations, courts rarely mention specifically the economic benefits in-
uring to some from excluding certain actions from the neighborhood.
Rather, the government's police power to "promote the general wel-
fare" provides the requisite constitutional foundation. Courts have up-
held density controls, however, based not on the police power but on
a separate statute designed to promote the general economy, welfare,
and prosperity of the town through density controls.92 This suggests
a possible constitutional basis for protecting solar collectors simply as
economic values. There would be no difficulty, however, in justifying
the protection of solar collectors as devices to enhance health and wel-
fare by reducing pollution and conserving resources, purposes well
within the traditional justification for zoning regulation.93
IV. EXISTING LAWS TO PROTECT LIGHT AccEss
FOR HEAT AND POWER
Oregon and Colorado, in 1975, enacted statutes to protect access to
sunlight for solar collectors.9 They are the only states to have done
so.
9 5
A. Oregon Statute
In 1975 Oregon amended its land-use and zoning statutes to include
several references to solar energy. 96 Oregon has a comprehensive
land-use planning mechanism, 97 in which a state commission prepares
91. Anderson v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 198, 201, 390 P.2d 994, 996 (1964).
92. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
93. Id. at 394-95.
94. See notes 96-114 infra and accompanying text.
95. Other statutes related to solar energy are beyond the scope of this paper.
96. 1975 Or. Laws ch. 153, §§ 1-3 (amending OR. REv. STAT. §§ 215.055, 215.110,
227.090, & 227.230 (1971)).
97. See OR. Rv. STAT. §§ 197, 215, & 227 (1975) (statewide planning commission,
empowered to enforce recommendations on cities and counties).
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statewide planning goals and guidelines a "designed to promote the
public health, safety and general welfare . ... "I All land-use
plans and zoning ordinances must comply with the goals and guidelines
established by the commission. 100  The commission also prepares a
statewide land-use plan; may recommend ordinances to county gover-
ments to implement the plan;10 1 and may recommend to city councils
and require the adoption of methods to implement the state plan.10 2
City councils have the usual power to issue zoning regulations. 08
The 1975 amendments generally require state and local government
to consider solar energy as one of the relevant factors in the land-use
planning process. The state planning commission must include "inci-
dent solar energy and utilization" among the "considerations" on which
the state planning goals and guidelines are based, 0 4 which in turn will
determine the state's and counties' planning and zoning regulations.
The state commission has corresponding authority to recommend
county zoning regulations "protecting and assuring access to incident
solar energy"' 0 5 and building code provisions "including height and set-
back."'0 0 City planning commissions may recommend city zoning or-
dinances "limiting the use, height, area, bulk and other characteristics
of buildings and structures . . . . 10 Among its recommendations to
city councils concerning the regulation of future growth and develop-
ment, the city planning commission may include "appropriate public in-
centives for overall energy conservation . .1.0.
B. Colorado Statute
The Colorado statute'00 simply establishes terms that must be in-
cluded in any "easement obtained for the purpose of exposure of a so-
98. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.240 (1975).
99. OR. REV. STAT. § 215.055(1) (1975).
100. OR. REv. STAT. § 197.175 (1975) (city governments); id. § 215.055 (city
governments).
101. OR. REv. STAT. § 215.110(1)-(2) (1975).
102. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.310(3), (6) (1975).
103. Olt. REV. STAT. § 227.215(2) (1975).
104. OR. REv. STAT. § 215.055(1) (1975).
105. On . REv. STAT. § 215.110(2) (1975).
106. Id.
107. OR. Rv. STAT. § 227.090(1) (1975).
108. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.090(2) (1975).
109. CoO. REV. STAT. § 38-32.5-101 to -102 (Supp. 1975).
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lar energy device.""" The full text of the amendment is given in the
margin."' The statute does not purport to authorize such easements;
if otherwise good as conveyances, they would presumably be valid with-
out the statute's enactment. The terms that the statute requires seem
reasonable and practicable. The statute raises some question about a
conveyance or contract made after its effective date, yet not including
the required terms: Would such an instrument be enforceable between
the parties to it? The language of the statute limits its effect to "ease-
ments," and there is no indication whether the legislature meant to in-
clude contracts. Presumably, an agreement between two parties, bind-
ing so long as they own certain property, would be enforceable as a
contract if it failed to include the terms of the statute and merely said
something like, "A shall not make or permit any structure to cast a
shadow over B's solar collector as presently located." The statute ap-
parently limits only those agreements which would run with the land;
the reason for such a limitation is unclear.
As noted earlier, 112 the Colorado statute purports to determine that
it is necessary for the "immediate preservation of the public peace,
health and safety.""l 3 While supportable,"14 this broad justification is
110. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-32.5-101 (Supp. 1975).
111. Section 1. Title 38, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, as amended, is
amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW ARTICLE to read:
ARTICLE 32.5
Solar Easements
38-32.5-101. Solar easements--creation. Any easement obtained for the
purpose of exposure of a solar energy device shall be created in writing and
shall be subject to the same conveyancing and instrument recording require-
ments as other easements.
38-32.5-102. Contents. (1)Any instrument creating a solar easement shall
include, but the contents shall not be limited to:
(a) The vertical and horizontal angles, expressed in degrees, at which the
solar easement extends over the real property subject to the solar easement;
(b) Any terms or conditions or both under which the solar easement is
granted or will be terminated;
(c) Any provisions for compensation of the owner of the property benefit-
ting from the solar easement in the event of interference with the enjoyment of
the solar easement or compensation of the owner of the property subject to the
solar easement for maintaining the solar easement.
Section 2. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, determines,
and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the
public peace, health, and safety.
1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 1430.
112. See notes 89 & 111 supra and accompanying text.
113. Solar Easement Act, ch. 326, § 2, 1975 Colo. Sess. Law 1430, quoted in notes
89 & 111 supra.
114. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
395Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
396 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:375
unnecessary in a statute that affects no existing rights and simply spec-
ifies terms to be included in future conveyances. Considering the un-
certainty of the statute's effect, it would have been helpful had the leg-
islature spelled out its purpose more narrowly and clearly. The
economic value of solar access rights is sufficient to support the statute,
and may very well have been the principal object of the regulation.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION:
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION MODEL ACTS
The American Bar Foundation (ABF) is in the process of develop-
ing model statutes and ordinances relating to the use of solar energy,
as part of a National Science Foundation project, "Legal Issues Re-
lated to the Utilization of Solar Energy."115  The ABF has sponsored
at least two conferences on the subject and is circulating preliminary
drafts of model statutes."" The proposed model statutes deal with a
wide range of issues," 71 most of them outside the scope of this Article.
It is unfortunate that the proposals have not been disseminated for pub-
lic comment. There is no obvious reason for confidentiality at any
stage of such a project, and circulating draft statutes poses a danger
of enactment before exposure to general public scrutiny.
Three of the proposals being considered by the ABF are pertinent
to the present discussion. The first is a solar zoning ordinance," 8 to
be enacted by municipal governments. It would create three types of
districts: "mandatory solar use districts," "affirmative solar use dis-
tricts," and "other solar use districts." These would supplement tra-
115. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON SOLAR
ENERGY AND THE LAW, FEBRUARY 10, 1975, at iii (1975). The ABF project is supported
by a grant from the National Science Foundation's program, Research Applicable to
National Needs (RANN).
116. See Reitze & Reitze, Protecting a Place In the Sun (pt. 2), 18 ENVIRONMENT
July/Aug. 1976, at 4, 5.
117. In addition to the proposals mentioned in the text, see notes 118-25 infra and
accompanying text, the proposals involve such matters as "improving the public econom-
ics of solar energy systems" (subsidies suggested); "improving the operation and design
of systems through cooperation with public utilities"; "removing potential construction
and maintenance problems"; "improving the financing arrangements for solar energy
systems"; and "increasing the number of available solar energy systems." See note 115
supra. The model acts and accompanying justifications comprise hundreds of pages
of elaborate detail.
118. Municipal Solar Zoning Ordinance, ABF Model Acts 219 (May 1976) (type-
written, available from American Bar Foundation, Chicago).
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ditional zoning and building code provisions. In the first type of dis-
trict, solar use would be mandatory in all new construction or substan-
tial alterations that require new energy systems, with a possible waiver
on sufficient showing. In the second kind of district, building code re-
strictions on placement of structures and height limitations, etc., would
be entirely waived for solar collectors. In the third type of district, the
municipality would merely be free to encourage solar use by granting
exceptions from various building code and setback restrictions for solar
collectors.
This appears to be the simplest of the major ABF approaches to the
problem of protecting solar radiation access, and does not seem to suf-
fer from any serious problems.
A second proposed statute' 19 would authorize municipalities to pur-
chase or condemn airspace in furtherance of a comprehensive plan for
the use of solar energy. The proposal is prompted by a concern that
the police power of the state will not support zoning for solar access
that disturbs rights in existing structures,120 or that municipalities will
hesitate to exercise this power, preferring to purchase property or pro-
vide compensation for loss in value.' 2' The concern about the limits
of zoning power is probably unjustified; 12 2 the exercise of eminent do-
main in such cases would raise at least as serious constitutional prob-
lems as the exercise of the police power. 123  It is by no means clear
that condemning one structure owned by a private person to protect
a solar collector planned by another private person would be a legiti-
mate public purpose. 24  Furthermore, there are real questions
119. Required Municipal Use of Eminent Domain to Protect Solar Skyspace, ABF
Model Acts 133 (May 1976) (typewritten, available from American Bar Foundation,
Chicago). A related ordinance, id. at 239, would empower the municipality to utilize
transferable development rights to promote protection of solar skyspace, and refers the
reader to Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban
Landmarks, 85 HAv. L. REV. 574 (1972), which discusses such a system.
120. Required Municipal Use of Eminent Domain to Protect Solar Skyspace, supra
note 119, at 136.
121. Id. at 137.
122. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
123. The police power and the right of eminent domain are both implicated in many
environmental and land-use planning programs, see generally Sax, Takings & The Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964), and create similar questions. The "public purpose"
required for the exercise of eminent domain may justify a taking beyond the police power
of the state, see I P. NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMArN § 1.42(7) (rev. 3d ed. 1976), but solar
zoning is well within the police power. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
124. There is substantial doubt whether the shift of property from one private person
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whether it is advisable to create such extensive powers to disturb exist-
ing property rights to protect other private interests. The proposal to
authorize purchase is reasonable, if in fact a municipality lacks such
authority under a comprehensive land-use plan.
Finally, the ABF is considering a proposal for a statute creating solar
easements through prescription,:2 5 which would permit such easements
after the filing of notice of an intent to use a solar collector, the pas-
sage of seven years, and the actual use of a collector during part of that
time. The effect of such a statute would be to permit private parties,
after seven years notice, to compel the removal of adjoining structures.
Even if there were independent justification for such a statute, the zon-
ing and eminent domain statutes also under consideration would render
the easement proposal superfluous.
The proposals discussed here, like others being considered by the
ABF, show the results of a great deal of capable effort, but attempt
more than is required. A more profitable line of approach would begin
with consideration of the least possible legislation needed to assure ac-
cess to sunlight for solar collectors.
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. A Minimal Approach
Perhaps the first question that should be asked is: What will happen
if we make no changes in the law? There is, of course, no certain pre-
diction, but reasonable speculation can be useful. The American legal
system might be sufficiently flexible to overcome the access problem
even without legislation. Let us see how this might work.
A reasonable person planning a solar system will consider the expo-
sure available. If present exposure is insufficient, his planning is likely
to halt at that point and it seems unreasonable to call on new laws to
permit him to demolish surrounding structures to make a solar collector
feasible.126 If sunlight is already available, the reasonable person will
to another, even in pursuit of a government plan, may be a "public purpose." See 2A P.
NIcHoLS, supra note 123, § 7.2(1) n.5 (collecting authorities that condemned property
must be available for use and enjoyment by the public).
125. Creation, Allocation and Destruction of Solar Skyspace Rights, ABF Model Acts
168 (May 1976) (available from American Bar Foundation, Chicago).
126. In built-up areas like downtown business districts it may be very difficult for the
owner of a single building to acquire enough access to sunlight on his own property to
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consider present and proposed zoning and building code regulations,
setback requirements, etc., and place the collector where interference
is unlikely for many years. In short, he will rely on present zoning-
building code provisions to protect solar access. If the zoning or build-
ing codes do protect a planned solar collector the owner is free to pur-
chase negative easements from his neighbors, or to enter into personal
contracts assuring solar access. Anyone planning a solar collector must
consider the cost of assuring access to sunlight through such voluntary
agreements or conveyances, but as the neighbors will give up some-
thing of value-a portion of the rights to airspace over their land-
it is reasonable that the party who expects to benefit from receiving
these rights should offer compensation.
The only threat to access assured by zoning and private agreements
is the very real possibility of change in zoning regulations or, more fre-
quently, the granting of variances. Some modest new. legislation would
be justified to assure compensation to the owners of solar collectors af-
fected by such changes in zoning. A zoning board might be required
to include in any variance or alteration of general zoning regulations
a proviso that reasonable compensation be offered to owners of any ad-
versely affected solar collectors.
At least as regards access to sunlight, present law amply protects
such rights as are justified by the economic value of solar collectors,
and a modest change in statutes governing zoning would complete the
mantle of protection. It may be, however, that the present legal system
gives insufficient inducement to property owners to construct solar col-
lectors. The present system requires a property owner to secure nega-
tive easements from what may be a large number of adjoining prop-
erty owners in a built-up area; the cost of securing easements or pre-
paring private agreements may be considerable compared with the cost
of a single home's solar collector. Substantial new legislation, if any,
should create a mechanism through which a property owner can secure
the protection provided under present zoning and property law at much
reduced expense.
make solar heating, cooling or electric power feasible. When this is so, it may be more
reasonable to provide solar power from a central utility than to try to balance competing
demands for inadequate sunlight. A central solar utility presumably would have the
powers of eminent domain ordinarily delegated to public utilities. The legal questions
raised by the creation of solar central station heating or power plants are well beyond the
scope of this Article, and have not been seriously considered elsewhere.
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B. A Solar Rights Zoning Guarantee Statute
The following is an outline of a proposed statute for a state-wide pro-
gram to provide a solar zoning-building code access guarantee. The
basic concept is that on private request, current and foreseeable zoning
and planning conditions are guaranteed so that the solar collector's
owner will suffer no financial loss because of new construction in the
neighborhood during the life of the certification. The proposed system
is a hybrid of zoning regulations and easements, founded on the police
power to promote the general welfare, as well as the state's traditional
powers to define and prohibit acts of trespass and public and private
nuisances. It will protect rights of the collector's owner to the extent
he could obtain protection, with more difficulty, through existing law.
To this extent it will promote solar power use and allow changes in
land-use patterns in accordance with other general plans in regard to
zoning and building. It does not create new rights or absolute legal
protection from shadows infringing on a solar collector. It therefore
does a minimum of injury to existing or competing rights. No attempt
has been made to use the elaborate technical language found in some
proposals in this field; ordinary language is sufficient. Although the
proposal is for state legislation, the concept may as easily be used di-
rectly in a municipal ordinance.
VII. PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LIGHT AccEss FOR
SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS
1) A state agency would be established or designated to delegate
the issuance, in conformity to state standards, of Solar Collection System
Protection Certificates. In the absence of a municipally operated cer-
tification system conforming to these standards, the state agency could
assume the function directly, charging the local government a sufficient
fee to cover the costs involved.
2) A property owner desiring certification for either a proposed
or existing solar energy collector would pay a fee, set by the local im-
plementation authority, approved as reasonable under local conditions
by the state agency.
3) The local implementation authority would provide notice of the
application to all owners of record of real property within a 150-foot
radius of the solar collector location, as well as to owners of any other
nearby property which the applicant specifically designates. Notice
would include adequate provision for obtaining detailed information on
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the proposed certification, as well as provision for offering comments
and/or official intervention if desired. The implementing authority
could schedule and hold a public hearing at its discretion.
4) The implementing authority would be required to consider all
known planning for the area, as well as the zoning, building code, and
setback provisions and easements currently in effect. No reasonably
foreseeable use of the affected property would be subject to the limita-
tions set by the certificate. The implementing authority could specifi-
cally authorize certain uses of the affected property, or could issue cer-
tificates against specific types of intrusions on solar access. Certificates
would issue for a fixed period of time, and would limit the guarantee
of solar access to three and one half hours before and after noon, stand-
ard time.
5) Certification, if issued, would be renewable under conditions
and fees not exceeding those of currently available first-time certifi-
cates, but may be subject to greater limitations on time and scope of
protection at the discretion of the implementing authority.
6) Certification could not be arbitrarily withheld.
7) Aggrieved parties could appeal the decisions of implementing
authorities to the state agency, which, however, could not overrule the
reasonable exercise of discretionary powers. Further appeal to the
state's courts would depend on state law.
8) If granted, copies of the certification would be a) issued to the
applicant property owners; b) placed on file with the implementing au-
thority for its own use; c) filed with the state agency for statistical, in-
formational, and records purposes; and d) recorded and filed with the
Recorder of Deeds for the locality. Notice of the certification would
also be filed with the records of each piece of property affected by the
certification, in the same manner as are records of easements.
9) Certification would accompany the location, regardless of whether
the specific solar collector has been replaced in whole or part, so long
as the replacement makes no essential difference in a specific re-
quest to enforce the protection offered by certification. The effects
of certification on the affected nearby properties would run with the
land for the life of the certification, and changes of ownership would
be immaterial.
10) The owner of the certificated property may notify both the im-
plementing authority and the owner of any nearby property if such prop-
erty undergoes changes, planned or otherwise, that significantly inter-
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fere with the operation of the certified solar collector. The owner of
the property from which the shadow is cast must then use due diligence
to eliminate the shadow insofar as it significantly interferes with the
operation of the solar collector during the protected period of three and
one half hours before and after noon, standard time. Alternatively,
the owner of the property from which the shadow is cast may, at his
option, pay reasonable compensation to the owner of the adversely
affected collector.
11) Upon written petition of both parties, and payment of a rea-
sonable fee, the implementing authority or the state agency may make
a binding determination of what compensation, if any, is justifiable un-
der the circumstances of an alleged shadow intrusion. The arbitrator
so chosen shall also have the power to suggest but not require that the
parties agree on a nonfinancial solution to the problem. The arbitrator
must set a compensation figure to be paid in lieu of an agreement to
end the problem otherwise, unless the arbitrator finds that the com-
plainant has suffered no substantial adverse effect, in which case he
is entitled to no payment.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss3/1
